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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Sufficiency of Felony Indictment
Where Word "Feloniously" Is Omitted
-Petitioner, who sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleged -that his
confinment in the state penitentiary was illegal in that the indictment
under which he pleaded guilty to assault with intent to Tob was insuf-
ficient to charge such offense in that it did not allege that the acts were
done feloniously. Held, with one judge dissenting, that the judgement,
sentence, and commitment were void. Robbery, or an attempt to com-
mit robbery, is defined as a felony in W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, § 12
(Michie 1955), and it is essential to the validity of a felony indictment
that there be an allegation that the acts constituting the offense were
feloniously committed. The court stated that such a defect in an indict-
ment is not within the curative provisions of the criminal statute of
jeofails. State ex rel. Vandal v. Adams, 115 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va.
1960).
The dissenting opinion expresses the view that the indictment
defined a statutory offense which provides that a violation thereof
constitutes a felony, and that ",the presence or absence of the word
'feloniously' from the indictment does not determine whether the of-
fense charged therein is or is not a felony." In any event, such an
omission or defect should be cured by the criminal statute of jeofails.
The conflict between the majority and dissenting opinions as
regards the statute of jeofails gives rise to the issue of whether a de-
fect such as the omission of the word "feloniously" should be within
the curative provisions of the statute. This statute states: "Judgement
in any criminal case, after a verdict, shall not be . . . reversed upon
any exception to the indictment . . . if the offense be charged therein
with sufficient certainty for judgement to be given thereon, according
to the very right of the case." W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 2, § 11 (Mi-
chie 1955). In determining the effect of this statute in State v. Davis,
87 W. Va. 184, 104 S.E. 484 (1920), the court said that although the
statute relaxes the strict common law requirements for an indictment,
it is "not to 'be interpreted as an invitation to laxity or looseness in its
averments," but that its only purpose is to cure technical defects which
do not tend to the prejudice of either the state or the accused. This
construction was followed in State v. McGinnis, 116 W. Va. 473, 181
S.E. 820 (1935), where the court stated that the purpose of the statute
is to cure inconsequential but not basic defects. Similar statutes of
jeofails are 'held to have the same effect -as that 'given the West Virgin-
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ia statute. 42 C.IS. Indictments § 333 (1944). This source states that
such statutes do not permit the omission of essential elements, and
that where an offense is not sufficiently described such is not a formal
defect. Such statutes while curing defects in form do not abolish the
necessity of alleging matters of substance.
The interpretation of the statute of jeofails creates the crux of the
problem, that is, is the omission of the word "feloniously" a material
defect or one of mere form? The same degree of accord that prevails
as regards the effect of statutes of jeofails is not to be found as regards
the necessity of the word "feloniously." 16 WORDS & PHRASES, Felon-
iously 669, 680 (Penn..Ed. 1959).
That the word "feloniously" must be used is the settled law of
this state. State v. Whitt, 39 W. Va. 468, 19 S.E. 873 (1894). Here
the court held that a felony indictment is insufficient where the acts
constituting the offense are not alleged to have been done feloniously.
In this case the defendant was before the court on a writ of error, and
the court stated that it was immaterial that he had not challenged the
sufficiency of the indictment in the trial court for "errors of this char-
acter can be taken advantage of for the first time in this court." Other
courts, although not applying the rule, recognize that at common law
it was necessary to use the word "feloniously" in a felony indictment.
Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 464, 467 (1895); Hamilton v.
State, 133 Fla. 481, 486, 182 So. 854, 856 (1938); Jolly v. Common-
wealth, 136 Va. 756, 761, 118 S.E. 109, 111 (1923). See generally
4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1772 (12th ed.
1957). In the Bannon case, the Court noted that in cases of -felonies at
common law, felonious intent was an essential element and that an
indictment failing to allege such intent would be defective even after
verdict. Thus, it can be said with certainty, that at common law the
failure to allege that the acts were done feloniously would have been
a material defect.
In State v. Young, 134 W. Va. 771, 779, 61 S.E.2d 734, 739
(1950), the court stated that the statute dealing with robbery, W. VA.
CODE ch. 61, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1955), does not enumerate the
necessary elements essential to charge the offense of robbery, but only
describes certain aspects of the offense while declaring that it is a
felony. Thus, it might well follow that Tesort must be had to the com-
mon law which requires an allegation that the acts constituting the
offense were feloniously committed.
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However, there are several cases holding that it is not necessary
that the word "feloniously" be used in a felony indictment. Bannon
v. United States, supra; Hamilton v. State supra; Jolly v. Common-
wealth, supra. In the Bannon and Jolly cases the Courts held that the
word "feloniously" is not necessary in an indictment for an offense
created by statute unless "feloniously" is used in -the statute as part of
the definition of the crime. In the Hamilton case, the court relied on a
statute which expressly stated that it was not necessary to allege that
the offense was -feloniously committed.
But in State v. Griffin, 79 Iowa 568, 44 N.W. 813 (1890),
where the defendant was convicted of larceny, the court on appeal
held that it was not essential to the validity of an indictment that there
be -an allegation .that the acts were feloniously committed. While ad-
mitting that "under our practice such is usually averred," the court
stated that "an averment that -the defendant 'took, stole, and carried
away' a certain horse, is sufficient to show the animus with which the
act was done." Without doubt, the Griffin case is contra to the rule in
West Virginia. And, although the Bannon case and like cases do not
directly contravene -the holding in the principal case they lend support
to the theory that the failure to allege that the acts were feloniously
done is a defect of form, and not of substance.
Perhaps, in evaluating these conflicting positions, it would not be
unfair to say that the foundation upon which the majority opinion in
the principal case rests is precedent, while the theory of the dissenting
opinion and like authority is that by not allowing such defects to in-
validate indictments justice 'will be facilitated in a large number of
criminal ,cases. A prime factor to 'be considered is 'whether an accused
would be prejudiced if the statute of jeofails cured such defects as the
omission of the word "feloniously." The Bannon, Hamilton, and Jolly
cases, supra, would seem to indicate that an accused would not be
prejudiced 'by such an omission. However, a more definite answer is
to ,be found in Wagner v. State, 43 Neb. 1, 61 N.W. 85 (1894). Here,
the court, in discussing the statute of jeofails, which in effect provided
that no judgment would 'be deemed invalid for 'any defects which do
not operate to the prejudice of the defendant on the merits, said that
"the omission of the purely expletive 'feloniously' could not by any
possibility tend to the prejudice of Wagner upon the merits."
All -that is required by the West Virginia constitution is that the
accused "be fully and plainly informed of the character and cause of
the accusation." W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 14. Whether the inclusion
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of the word "feloniously" -is necessary to "fully and plainly inform"
the defendant is open to question in light of the cases cited above hold-
ing that its use is not essential. Possibly, a felonious intent could be
implied from the acts in themselves, or by a fair construction could be
found within the terms 'of the indictment. In the Griffin case, supra,
the court stated ithat the allegation that the defendant "stole" the horse
is as "plain and unmistakable an averment that the act was done 'fel-
oniously' as if that word had 'been used." In Hagner v. United States,
285 U.S. 427 (1932), the Court in discussing the federal statute of
jeofails said that "upon a proceeding, after verdict at least, no preju-
dice being shown, it is enough that the necessary facts appear .in any
form, or by fair construction can be found within the terms of the in-
dictment." The Court stated that this statute was enacted to the end
that, "while the accused must be afforded ul protection, the guilty
shall not escape through mere imperfection of pleading." From these
authorities it might well be concluded that the inclusion of the word
"feloniously" does not aid in fully informing the defendant of the
charges against him, but that its omission simply -works to the benefit
of the guilty so that justice may be circumvented.
Admittedly the decision in the Vandal case is correct when con-
sidered with respect to the rule established in this state. However, the
time is ripe for reconsideration of many of the common law technicali-
ties plaguing the 'administration of criminal justice. Such rules, which
came into existence when the punishment for crime was harsh, were
resorted to 'by the courts to prevent injustice from being done. The
cruelty connected with criminal law has passed to a great extent, and
with it, the reason for such rules. People v. Cohen, 303 Ill. 523, 525,
135 N.E. 731 (1922). The need for a revision of criminal procedure
in West Virginia has been well expressed by a Supreme Court judge.
See Calhoun, Suggestions for Simplification of Criminal Procedure, 60
W. VA. L. REV. 123 (1958). Judge Calhoun expresses the opinion
that 'harmless error and technicalities which have evolved from ancient
time should be reconsidered and revised o facilitate the rendering of
justice. Quite possibly the state legislature should assume this duty,
for until it does something positive to resolve the problem, it may be
difficult for the courts -to ignore technicalities so that judgement may
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